PREventing EMerging Pathogenic Threats Program Overview
During US international operations, military forces are deployed to remote locations around the globe, often in areas where endemic and emerging diseases are prevalent. Most of these emerging and re-emerging diseases originate in animal reservoirs and then jump into humans. Despite biosurveillance efforts around the globe, viral outbreaks continue to outpace preparedness with new viral infectious diseases arising every year. Current approaches to biosurveillance focus on detection of known pathogens in human populations, human-to-human transmission, and modeling the trajectory of the epidemic following an outbreak event. Animal pathogens that have the potential to infect humans, but have not yet spilled over, are rarely considered. As a result, infectious agents are detected only after an outbreak, health responses are largely reactive, and often arrive late. The PREEMPT program represents a radical departure from current practice, aiming to target viral biothreats within animal reservoir to preempt their entry into human populations before an outbreak occurs.
To combat viruses that may emerge or re-emerge from animal populations or are transmitted by insect vectors, the PREEMPT program aims to:
- Produce and validate integrated multiscale models and experimental testbeds that quantify the probability a human virus pathogen will emerge from an animal reservoir.
- Develop scalable approaches to suppress and prevent species jump from wild or domestic reservoirs and/or to impede insect-mediated viral transmission.
- Validate experimentally preemptive methods.
- Initially assess scalability and sustainability of preemptive platforms.
Successful teams will address and integrate these program components to demonstrate proof-of-principle of a block-before-jump preemptive capability.
DARPA anticipates that PREEMPT will encompass a 42-month program with a 24-month Phase I and an 18-month Phase II. During the Phase I period, performer teams will identify genetic adaptations that enable species jump (e.g. develop genotype-to-phenotype maps across relevant species), develop mathematical models to quantify the probability of species jump based on molecular and ecological data, identify potential bottlenecks for intervention, and develop initial scalable platforms to target the reservoirs and/or vectors to prevent viral species jump into humans. During Phase II, performers will extend Phase I modeling efforts to quantify intra- and inter-species viral amplification dynamics and transmission, develop integrated models for risk assessment, and validate experimentally the new preemptive approaches.
To accomplish the objectives of each Phase, the program will be structured in two Technical Areas (TAs) addressed concurrently: 1) produce and validate integrated multiscale models and experimental testbeds that quantify the probability a human pathogen will emerge from an animal reservoir; 2) develop and validate scalable approaches that target the animal virus in its reservoir(s) and suppress the likelihood of virus jump into humans.
